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The Colored Man Standing By the Punch Bowl
Abstract
This essay will explore racial dissonance and how it affects our thinking about race relations and social policy
in America. The first part of this essay will examine the concept of race. Though we often think of race as
delineating real characteristics that exist objectively, race is actually a socially created abstraction. In addition,
how this abstraction changes over time will also be explored. This is another way of saying that "colored
people" has been replaced by the term "black people." The difference between the two terms raises important
questions about social policy. Next, this article explores the connection among racial terms, social change, and
social policy. It will explore in broad terms what it means to be colored in America and how the Civil Rights
Movement of the 50s and 60s replaced the term "colored" with the terms "African-American" and/or "Black."
The essay seeks to answer the question of what is the difference between the terms and how does that
difference shape race relations and social policy. Specifically, why is it difficult to formulate a social policy, such
as affirmative action, and apply it to the needs of colored people, but less difficult if we apply it to black
people?
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THE COLORED MAN STANDING BY 
THE PUNCH BOWL 
Prof Michael K. Jordan * 
Imagine attending a social gathering where there are a num-
ber of people who have never met. You are standing with a group 
of friends, one of whom is attempting to describe an individual 
standing across the room. Finally, your friend identifies the individ-
ual by saying the person he is talking about is the "colored man 
standing by the punch bowl." My guess is you would experience a 
significant level of discomfort. You might even wonder how any 
friend of yours could use that term. Certainly the individual standing 
by the punch bowl may be a person of color, but not a colored person. 
However, I am old enough to remember when I and people who 
looked like me were referred to as being colored, not of color, 
black or Mrican American. As best I can remember, the white peo-
ple who called me colored were not doing so in an intentionally 
malicious way, I was simply a colored boy. 
Many years ago, Althea Gibson and Jackie Robinson broke the 
color barrier in tennis and baseball. She was a colored tennis 
player, he was a colored baseball player. I remember viewing in a 
theater Jackie's biography and everyone, including Jackie, referred 
to him as being colored. The application of the term colored to 
Jackie and Althea seemed as natural then as its use now feels awk-
ward and embarrassing. For example, Tiger Woods is the number 
one golfer in the world and has achieved demigod status in the 
golfing world. The Williams sisters (Venus and Serena) are recog-
nized as being top tennis professionals. Before them, Arthur Ashe 
enjoyed widespread success on the professional tennis circuit. 
Clearly Tiger, Arthur and the Williams sisters have broken color 
barriers in golf and tennis that were equally as daunting as those 
faced by Jackie Robinson and Althea Gibson. Has anyone thought 
of or referred to Woods or Ashe as being a colored golfer or tennis 
player? Similarly, has anyone referred to the benefits and disadvan-
tages of affirmative action for colored people? Whatever strengths and 
weaknesses this social program may possess, they are either e~oyed 
* Michael K. Jordan is a professor of law at William Mitchell College of Law in St. 
Paul, MN. Asst. Atty. Gen., Iowa Atmy. Gen. Off., Des Moines, 1981-83; Spec. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Minnesota Atty. Gen. Off., St. Paul, 1983-85; Labor Counsel, Northwest 
Airlines, St. Paul, 1985-88. J.D., 1980, Iowa. A.B., 1975, Bowdoin College. 
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or borne by black people or Mrican Americans, not colored people. 
This avoidance of certain racial terms in particular socio/historical 
contexts is worthy of a great deal more thought than we give to it. 
Instead of identifYing something extant in the real world, use of 
the term colored serves as a window through which others may 
peer into you. Just as we have all stared, out of curiosity, at some-
one wearing dated clothing at an important social event, using the 
term "colored" suggests something equally as peculiar about the 
user of the term. 
Thinking of Tiger as a colored golfer or how affirmative action 
harms or benefits coloreds juxtaposes words and ideas that do not 
seem to mesh. There is a certain racial dissonance created when we 
think of a colored Tiger but not when we think about a colored 
Jackie. There is disharmony between the racial group designation 
(colored, black or Mrican American) and the corresponding activ-
ity engaged in by the individual designated as colored. Quite sim-
ply, colored men and women cannot excel in golf today, but 
Mrican Americans, black people or people of color can. 
Racial dissonance exists in other contexts as well. Consider, for 
example, the concurring opinion of Justice Thomas in Missouri v. 
Jenkins. 1 At issue in Jenkins was the legitimacy of a broad remedial 
order issued in a school desegregation case. The Court held that 
the district court exceeded its remedial powers when it issued the 
order.2 Justice Thomas, however, examined what he thought lay 
hidden beneath the order. The order was based upon tacit assump-
tions which were used by the district court when it assessed the 
quality of predominately black schools. Thomas believed the judge 
who issued the order assumed that a predominately black institu-
tion must be inferior to a racially integrated one.3 Students in pre-
dominately black schools simply could not obtain the same level of 
instructions and educational success as they would have if they 
were learning side-by-side with white students.4 
1 515 U.S. 70(1995). 
2 Id. at 100-02. 
3 jenkins, 515 U.S. at 114. 
4 Id. at 121-22. It was reported that during the Justices' conference at which jen-
kins was discussed Justice Thomas made a highly personal appeal related to his exper-
iences with segregated schools. In his experience the difficulty with segregation had 
nothing to do with the absence of white students sitting next to him in the classroom. 
The problem was that he and other students did not have equal facilities such as 
heating, books and chairs. See Eleanor Brown, Black Like Me? "Gangsta "Culture, Clarence 
Thomas and Afrocentric Academies, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 308, 318 (2000). Justice Thomas 
expressed a similar sentiment in his concurring opinion in Adarand Construction Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Adarand involved a challenge to a federal highway con-
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This unexamined assumption invariably led to broad and erro-
neous judicial remedies. The judge ignored the real issue in the 
case, which was what caused the segregated schools: intentional 
acts by the state or something else which would be beyond the 
reach of the Equal Protection Clause. Moreover, the judge could 
not consider any proposition that equated black schools with edu-
cational excellence. Thomas, however, was willing to entertain pre-
cisely the opposite view. Historically black middle and high schools 
as well as colleges have been symbols of excellence and are exam-
ples of institutions that "can function as the center and symbol of 
black communities, and provide examples of independent black 
leadership, success and achievement."5 Thomas was unrelenting in 
his challenge to what he characterized as demeaning assumptions 
about the ability of black students and a disregard of the historical 
evidence demonstrating that blacks were capable of educational 
success in predominately black schools. There is, however, another 
aspect to this debate that is frequently missed and illustrates how 
racial dissonance operates. 
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation6 the separation of the races was simply a social reality that 
did not necessarily "stamp the colored race with a badge of social 
inferiority."7 If the colored race is inferior it is not because of legis-
lation, rather the legislation simply acknowledges preexisting cir-
cumstances. The two races could not live together until they 
developed a mutual appreciation of each other's qualities and 
chose to voluntarily live together. Legislation could not mandate 
this end.8 Brown gave us a new vision of the races and how they 
could or could not live together. Segregation was no longer in the 
struction program that awarded contracts based in part upon the race of the subcon-
tractor. The Court held that the federal program was subject to strict scrutiny analysis 
notwithstanding the fact that the program originated with Congress rather than the 
states. Justice Thomas characterized the program as involving racial paternalism. "So-
called "benign" discrimination teaches many that because of chronic and apparently 
immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete with whites without their patroniz-
ing indulgence. Inevitably, such programs engender attitudes of superiority or, alter-
natively, provoke resentment among those who believe that they have been wronged 
by the government and its use of race." Id. at 241. One clearly senses Thomas' belief 
that the patronizing indulgence which produced the preference program in Adarand 
was operating the same way in Jenkins and led judges to believe that black students 
could not excel in school without the beneficial presence of whites. In both instances 
it elevated whites to a position of power over blacks and underestimated the power of 
blacks, given an equal opportunity, to fend for themselves. 
5 Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 122. 
6 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
7 Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). 
8 Id. at 551. 
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nature of things; an outgrowth of the lack of mutual appreciation 
of the qualities of each race. Instead, separation denoted a de-
graded state for blacks regardless of how objectively similar the cir-
cumstances may be for the two races.9 
As with the difficulty of thinking about Tiger Woods as a 
colored golfer, it is equally as difficult, according to Justice 
Thomas, for judges to think of predominately black schools as be-
ing anything other than a badge of inferiority. Colored schools are 
to segregated schools asJackie Robinson (a colored ballplayer) was 
to baseball. Both are rooted in a particular view of the races, their 
relationship with each other, and the social institutions created to 
accommodate this social reality. In a post-Brown world it is difficult 
to conceive of a predominately black school using pre-Brown cog-
nitive imagery. 
This essay will explore racial dissonance and how it affects our 
thinking about race relations and social policy in America. Why is it 
we simply cannot or simply choose not to think of Tiger Woods as a 
colored golfer or affirmative action as benefiting or harming 
colored people? The answer lies in our conception of race and 
how the meaning of that term changes. Moreover, no matter how 
much we may think we hold a particular view of what race means 
and how we apply that term in guiding us in our mundane activi-
ties, a deeper revelation about our views becomes possible only 
when we apply our concept of race to shape social policy. As will 
become clear, we often arrive at rational decisions about racial so-
cial policy that are chagrined by the extent to which our rational 
choices are at odds with other deeply held yet less conscious as-
sumptions about race. 
The first part of this essay will examine the concept of race. 
Though we often think of race as delineating real characteristics 
that exist objectively, race is actually a socially created abstraction. 
In addition, how this abstraction changes over time will also be ex-
plored. This is simply another way of saying that, in America, the 
term "colored people" has been replaced by the term "black peo-
ple." The difference between the two terms raises important ques-
tions about social policy. For instance, to what extent does 
changing a racial term used to designate the same group of people 
reflect actual changes in the group itself or attitudes towards the 
group? If various terms represent specific attitudes it is a possibility 
that social policy may be altered to reflect changing attitudes about 
9 Brawn, 347 U.S. at 493-94. 
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the group. It is also possible that policy may be in conflict with the 
terms used to define the racial group. 
These possibilities suggest that it is useful to explore the con-
nection among racial terms, social change and social policy. I will, 
therefore, explore in broad terms what it means to be colored in 
America and how the Civil Rights Movement of the 50's and 60's 
replaced the term "colored" with the terms "Mrican-American" 
and/or "Black." We know the two are different since a "colored 
man" can no longer stand by a punch bowl. The question is what is 
the difference and how does that difference shape race relations 
and social policy. Specifically, why is it difficult to formulate a social 
policy, such as affirmative action, and apply it to the needs of 
colored people, but less difficult if we apply it to black people? 
RACE 
There is a tendency to think of racial terms as having a perma-
nent meaning. Race refers to a group of individuals who exist in 
the real world and possess certain attributes which determine how 
group members will interact among themselves and with members 
of different groups (races). Colored people is, therefore, a concept 
that has meaning because it accurately represents properties and 
relations existing objectively in the real world independently and 
beyond the control of the individual who uses the term. Since 
these concepts represent objective reality they are amenable to ma-
nipulation through our powers of reasoning. When we unleash our 
power of reasoning on racial terms we are engaging in the rule 
governed by manipulation of symbols or concepts to depict the 
proper (objective) relation between symbols and the objects these 
symbols represent. Moreover, by rationally manipulating these 
terms, we acquire a better understanding of the world.lO For simi-
lar reasons, the term racism acquires a fixed meaning. One can 
identify a racist by comparing his/her conduct and attitudes to a 
list of observable behaviors, patterns of thoughts and attitudes that 
have been objectively determined to represent racist attitudes or 
10 This is similar to what the expression "thinking like a lawyer" means. "Thinking 
like a lawyer" includes a particular type of relationship between mind, language and 
reality. When one thinks like a lawyer, one is manipulating objective transcendent 
principles which are reflected in the law. This process is value-free and is not sub-
servient to any particular political or social objective. See Michael Jordan, Law Teachers 
And The Educational Continuum, 5 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 41, 52 (1996). Similarly, racial 
terms reflect reality in the same way that thinking like a lawyer reflects transcendent 
realities that are free of individual manipulation and control. 
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conduct. I I 
Now recall the colored man at the punch bowl scenario. There 
are many of you who almost instinctively label the person using the 
term colored as being at best ignorant, at worst racist. This conclu-
sion was arrived at by referring to a list of behaviors which identi-
fies racist behavior. On that list was an item such as: Referring to a 
member of a racial group, other than your own, in a derogatory fashion. 
However, what was the derogatory term used? The statement de-
scribed a visible characteristic which was useful in identifying the 
stranger, yet few would deny the unsettling affect that hearing the 
term colored man would have on the gathering. However, the term 
colored did not always have this negative affect on people. Who 
would question the long history of the NAACP's active leadership 
in the fight for civil rights. Yet, this is the National Association for 
the Advancement of COLORED PEOPLE.12 Certainly this organiza-
tion was not racist, therefore, the use of the term colored does not 
necessarily denote a racist attitude. It appears that despite our be-
lief in the fixed objective reality that racial terms are presumed to 
represent, these terms are neither fixed nor firmly rooted in 
rationality. 
What then is the real problem posed by the colored man at 
the punch bowl? That is, how is it that an objective term describing 
people and an attitude towards them can be both fixed and objec-
tive yet also seem to vary in meaning over time. Pursuit of the an-
swer must begin with a willingness to lessen our hold on the notion 
that the concept of race and/or racism is rooted in a timeless and 
objective reality that exists apart from the social context in which 
these ideas are created and expressed. We make sense of the world 
by using culturally constructed and shared meanings about the 
world around us. These are not fixed ideas that remain constant 
over time. Instead, these are ideas that we assimilate and are often 
unaware of, yet they shape not only how we see the world but how 
we express our understanding of the world to each other. 13 Race is 
11 See Michael Jordan, The NLRB Discrimination Decisions, 1935-1964: The Empiric 
Process Of Administration And The inner Eye Of Racism, 24 Conn. L. Rev. 55, 67 (1991). 
12 The number of excellent studies on the history and protest activities of the 
NAACP are too numerous to list. See, e.g. HARRY AsHMORE, CIVIL RIGHTS AND WRONGS 
(1997); TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1954-1963 
(1988); HAROLD CRUSE, THE CRISIS OF THE NEGRO INTEU..ECTUAL A HISTORICAL ANALY-
SIS OF THE FAILURE OF BLACK LEADERSHIP, (1967) [hereinafter Cruse, The Crisis]; 
DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. AND THE SOUTHERN 
CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (1986). 
13 See Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension Of The Agon Between Legal Power And 
Narrative Meaning 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2225, 2230-35 (1989) [hereinafter Winter] ("Cen-
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a culturally shared concept used to explain observable differences 
between groups of people. Physical differences are imbued with 
cultural meanings, which are embraced as signifying objective real-
ity apart from the very culture that created the meaning of the 
term. Race is, therefore, a "folk classification" in that it presents 
popularly held beliefs about human differences. It is generated by 
"the ideologies, distinctions, and selective perceptions that consti-
tute a society's popular imagery and interpretations of the 
world."14 Folk classifications organize our experiences into a seam-
less coherent whole which explains and justifies social experiences 
and social policies. 15 
Science was also instrumental in shaping our erroneous view 
of race as being a natural phenomenon that exists in the real 
world. Scientific inquiry is nothing more than a way of knowing 
and understanding the world that excludes supernatural and mysti-
cal explanations. This type of understanding is based upon empiri-
cal knowledge objectively acquired through the human senses and 
mechanical techniques that enhance the senses. Inquiry is guided 
by uniform formal procedures that are free of individual manipula-
tion or idiosyncratic standards of validity. 16 Unfortunately, science 
was not always free of supernaturalistic or ideological influencesP 
The study of race is an example of one of the less than successful 
attempts of science to free itself from the influence of supernatu-
ralistic definitions and explanations of race. Science as well as the 
popular mind was held captive by folk classifications of race. 
Rather than subjecting popular conceptions of race to rigorous, 
uniform, and value-free analysis, science sought to justify them.18 
tral to the intel1ectual process is the construction and sharing within a culture of 
idealized cognitive models . .. to structure and make meaningful regular aspects of our 
daily experience. These are like "stock stories" or "folk theories" by which humans in 
a given culture organize the diverse inputs of daily life into meaningful gestalts that 
relate that which is "relevant" and ignore that which is not."). See generally MARKJOHN. 
SON, THE BODY IN THE MIND THE BODILY BASIS OF MEANING, IMAGINATION, AND REAsON 
(1987); GEORGE LAKOFF AND MARKJOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE By (1980) (discuss-
ing human meaning, understanding and rationality). 
14 AUDREY SMEDLEY, RACE IN NORTH AMERICA ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF A 
WORLDVIEW 27 (1999) [hereinafter Smedley]. See generally THOMAS GoSSETT, RACE THE 
HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA (1997); IVAN HANNAFORD, RACE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN 
THE WEST (1996) (discussing the history of race). 
15 Id. at 2&-27. 
16 Id. at 153. 
17 Id. at 152-55. 
18 Science fil1ed the void left when the church and bible were no longer used as 
the authoritative sources to explain the world general1y and race specifical1y. How-
ever, science did not total1y reject the preexisting social and theological1y based as-
sumptions which helped to explain the world. "These assumptions related to the 
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Our thinking about race feels so natural and objective because of 
our belief that there is some measure of scientific validity which 
supports it. Mter all, we can observe differences between groups of 
people, so there must be some objective reason for these differ-
ences and rational inferences to be drawn from them. 
In this regard, science became a form of storytelling; it recog-
nized and responded to the behavior and feelings of individuals as 
they addressed problems posed by their culture. The appeal of sci-
ence was its ability to provide culturally acceptable interpretations 
of seemingly natural phenomena. The scientific study of race is 
better understood as a mode of analysis more familiar to the hu-
manities, involving metaphor and archetype. 19 The goal was to pro-
vide scientific answers to social and moral questions such as how 
does one justify mistreating groups of people because of the color 
of their skin and texture of their hair.20 
Of course, culturally based explanations of the world change; 
race is not an exception to this principle. This does not mean that 
cultural creations, such as folk classifications, can change in virtu-
ally unlimited ways simply because they are not constrained by ob-
jective rules. Folk classifications - definitions of race - change but 
change is limited and shaped by the very culture that generated the 
concept.21 For example, we know that the term colored at one time 
underlying cosmological and ideological themes of European cultures, specifically 
those values, beliefs, and "revealed" knowledge about God, nature, the world and 
humankind. In its early stages, the Judeo-Christian idea of a single creation and the 
Noachian explication of human diversity were some of the main survivals of Biblical 
thought in Science. Their persistence was based on unquestioning acceptance of the 
scriptural representation of human beginnings." Smedley, supra note 14, at 153. 
19 Metaphor and archetype are better understood as the tools of imaginative litera-
ture rather than rational scientific inquiry. These tools are used to describe the behav-
ior and feelings of people as they live through and reflect on problems created by 
their cultures. In literature, unique interpretations are given to events and these inter-
pretations are supported with evidence that cannot necessarily be proved or dis-
proved. The appeal of the metaphor and archetype is found in their language, depth 
of interpretation and consistency with accepted morals and values. "There are no 
critical tests to confirm or falsifY them. There are no natural laws from which they are 
derived. They are bound by time, by situation and above all by the cultural prejudices 
of the researcher or writer." NEIL POSTMAN, TECHNOPOLV: THE SURRENDER OF CULTURE 
TO TECHNOLOGY, 154 (1993). 
20 Jd. at 161-62. 
21 See Winter supra note 13, at 2244-45. Many have noted the erroneously held 
assumption that racial classification and racism disappear when terms or ideas used to 
describe a race in an offensive and oppressive manner are no longer in use. For exam-
ple, there are few who would attempt to justifY the separation of the races based upon 
biological differences between the races. However, the abandonment of biological 
justifications does not necessarily signifY the elimination of racism, but it does signal a 
change in the justification for discriminatory treatment. See, e.g., ROBERT L. ALLEN, 
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was an acceptable way to refer to a group of people but is now an 
inappropriate way to refer to the same group. This is an example of 
social change constrained by culturally based rather than objective 
rational rules. In the next section I will examine the different 
meanings associated with specific racial terms such as colored and 
black,22 but initially I will briefly focus on the process of social 
change. 
When we think of social change as it relates to race relations, 
most of us will have visual images, at least those of us who were 
born in the late forties or early fifties. Fire hoses, marches and the 
"I Have A Dream" speech by Martin Luther King are the visual 
images that mark swift and dramatic change in race relations. If, 
however, we are to deepen our understanding of racial changes 
and what effect those changes have on social policy, we need to 
broaden our view of the forces of social change to include the less 
dramatic. Long before Rosa Parks refused to give up her seat to a 
white person on a bus in Montgomery Alabama, colored people 
were defiantly refusing to submit to the indignities visited upon 
them whenever they engaged in the simple activity of riding a pub-
lic bus.23 It is far easier to recognize change after the fact than 
when it is happening. The tendency is, therefore, to associate 
RELUCTANT REFORMERS RACISM AND SOCIAL REFORM MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
255-277 (1974);James M. Blaut, The Theory Of Cultural Racism, 23 Antipode: A Radical 
Journal Of Geography 289-99 (1992); Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Sharing Space: Why Ra-
cial Goodwill Isn't Enough, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 1, 12-20 (1999) [hereinafter Rush, Racial 
Goodwill]. 
22 The terms colored and black are being used to signity specific views about race, 
however, it is not being argued that these two terms are not connected to each other. 
As described earlier, race is a folk classification not a scientific one. It is a dynamic 
concept that is subject to fluctuations in its expression and interpretation. Contradic-
tions and inconsistencies may exist at any given time and two different racial terms 
may not be mutually exclusive. See Smedley, supra note 14, at 27. One should not, 
therefore assume that my use of the terms colored and black signity two mutually 
exclusive racial views. They describe dominant characteristics found in the category 
that developed in response to prevailing social forces. Colored did not necessarily 
displace black. The process is better understood as one where additional ideas about 
race were added to our popular view of race. The two views may even blend were they 
are not inconsistent. Thus, it is possible for elements of black to exist in colored and 
elements of colored to exist in black. See also Robert Gordon Critical Legal Histories 36 
Stan. L. Rev. 57, 116-18 (1984) (structures of thought do not necessarily prescribe 
particular social outcomes but do offer a range of meanings and interpretations to 
use in interpreting social events and explaining historical events). 
23 See ROBIN, D.G. KELLEY, RACE REBELS: CULTURE, POLITICS AND THE BLACK WORK· 
ING CLASS Chap. 3 (1994) [hereinafter Kelly, Race Rebels] (working class struggle 
against segregation in public spaces goes unnoticed because it was unorganized and 
represented individual acts of defiance against authority and a demand for dignity 
and respect). 
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change with certain easily recognized events. Every school child in 
America knows that the civil rights movement began with Rosa 
Parks. Unfortunately this tends to associate social change with the 
actions of specific groups engaged in consciously planned actions 
directed at specific social conditions.24 We then assume there is a 
direct causal chain linking the deliberately organized action and 
the resulting change in the laws and racial attitudes. 
While this is one way in which change occurs along the racial 
frontier, it is not the only method. This perspective on social order 
is a top-down view. Well organized, powerful social and political 
groups recognize a problem, respond with a rational social and/or 
political agenda and conditions and ideas change, more often than 
not, for the better. 25 There is another perspective: the bottom-up 
view. It starts within individuals and emanates out to interaction 
among individuals, small groups, communities then regions. This 
view is at least as valid as the top down approach and in many re-
spects is a more accurate view of racial change in America.26 
24 The civil rights movement is frequently associated with middle class blacks and 
their demand for equal opponunity. Few scholars recognized the spontaneous acts of 
resistance of the black working and lower classes because it was neither organized nor 
accepted as legitimate by black leaders. For these leaders, the role models for proper 
behavior were supplied by middle class blacks. ld. at 3-6 and Chap. 4. See also DAVID 
lIALBERSTAM, THE CHILDREN 63-74 (1998) [hereinafter Halberstam, Children]. 
25 In the civil rights movement this view is best represented by the NAACP. During 
the early pan of the movement the NAACP was a well established bureaucratic organi-
zation that functioned on the basis of order and predictability. This strength was also 
a weakness in that it became difficult for the organization to respond to spontaneous 
grass roots mass action. The result was a conflict between local southern communities 
that wanted to plan and organize action locally and the centralized northern based 
leadership of the NAACP. See ALDON MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MoVE-
MENT BLACK COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE xi-xii, Chap. 3 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter Morris, Origins]. In response to this conflict there was a tendency for locally based 
organizations to ignore the NAACP and focus upon the direct participatory action of 
members of the local black community. These organizations tended to rely on preex-
isting local leadership and social institutions. See id.; Halbertstam, Children supra note 
24, at 215-19; RICHARD KING, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE IDEA OF FREEDOM Chap. 6 (1992) 
[hereinafter King, The Idea]. 
26 In retrospect there is a tendency to only examine the civil rights movement's 
affect on the legal and social order of America. What is forgotten is that the move-
ment began with the transformation of individuals. The most basic element of the 
movement was a new sense of self development by black people. There was a demand 
for respect from whites and a feeling of empowerment based upon the oven demand 
and actions taken to enforce the demand. This is bottom up change because it began 
with a change in how blacks thought about themselves and interpreted social exper-
iences. In fact, it can be argued that the entire history of the struggle for freedom by 
blacks has been one characterized by individual acts of resistance which were later 
followed by collective action. See VINCENT HARDING, THERE Is A RIvER-THE BLACK 
STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM IN AMERICA Chap. 5 (1981) [hereinafter Harding, The River]. 
This is not to deny the significance of collective action. However, it underscores what 
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The distinction between the two approaches is significant be-
cause of the folk classification nature of race. Race is a deeply held 
cultural construct that is not necessarily subject to conscious ra-
tional control and manipulation. It is, therefore, possible for one 
to consciously act in a way that is consistent with rationally held 
beliefs, yet one's conscious actions and rational thoughts are at 
odds with one's deeply held cultural assumptions about race. This 
is why top-down views of social change fail to capture significant 
aspects of social change. Well organized group actions may be pre-
ceded by significant less visible, but no less significant, attacks upon 
the underlying culturally based conception of the problem. What 
we see are highly visible social policies and we assume these poli-
cies and their advocates must have caused the change. In fact, the 
policy is a manifestation, not cause, of the change. Conversely, a 
social policy or movement may fail because of its inability to con-
sider the existing context in which it must be applied. It may make 
rational good sense, but is inconsistent with deeply held cultural 
perspectives about the nature of the issue being addressed by the 
policy.27 
This starts to sound similar to the reaction one has to hearing 
Tiger Woods referred to as a colored golfer or affirmative action 
working against the interests of colored people. It is dissonance, 
but now we can be a bit more specific about its source. It is the 
disjuncture between the way we consciously and rationally think 
about race and the deeply held beliefs about race which we hold 
and upon which we act. In the case of Tiger Woods we know ration-
ally that he is a gifted athlete in a sport that excluded people with 
brown skin. These descriptive facts are inconsistent with referring 
to Tiger as colored. Colored signifies something beyond facts and 
rational discourse. Similarly, affirmative action is easily described 
precedes collective organized action: individuals deciding to transform themselves 
then communicating these views and feelings to others in an effort to interpret their 
experiences and arrive at a common conception of self and the actions which need to 
be taken in response to these new conceptions. Moreover, I am not arguing that the 
two approaches are mutually exclusive. It is possible for the two types of change to 
support each other. See generally ANTHONY COOK, THE LEAsT OF THESE RACE, LAw, AND 
RELIGION IN AMERlCAN CULTURE Chap. 5 (1997) [hereinafter Cook, The Least]; Kelly, 
Race Rebels supra note 23, at 74-5, Chap. 4; King, The Idea supra note 25, at 4-9, 
Chaps. 2, 3; Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption, The Atlantic Monthly May 1999, 
at 55, 76-77. 
27 See generally Morris, Origins supra note 25, Chap. 11 (the success of the civil 
rights movement is found in its reliance upon traditions norms, institutions, and re-
sources in the community rather than the rejection of these resources in favor of a 
spontaneous outpouring of emotion in a largely unplanned and irrational response to 
the social system). 
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in social and legal terms that do not seem to fit the deeply held 
conception of what colored means. A top-down policy, such as af-
firmative action, just does not mesh with the visceral response 
evoked by the term colored. 
The next section will explore this conflict between rationally 
held beliefs about racial social and governmental policy and tena-
ciously held cultural constructions of race. Two folk constructions 
of race need to be explored: colored and black. Exactly what do 
these terms mean to us and why is it difficult, if not impossible, to 
use these terms interchangeably? 
COLORED 
Colored people were created in the post Civil War South. For-
mer slaves faced legally sanctioned acts of discrimination and vio-
lence. In this context, colored people -former slaves-faced the 
daunting task of carving out a place for themselves in a society 
where many doubted their ability to be productive members of so-
ciety. Colored, therefore, became a racial classification shaped by: 
the abolition of slavery; whites doubting the ability of the former 
slaves to function as self-sufficient rational human beings; and the 
desire of former slaves to demonstrate their ability to survive and 
flourish using their new found freedom.28 It was presumed that for-
mer slaves were incapable of building communities and sustaining 
themselves in these communities without the helping hand of for-
mer slaveholders.29 In effect, colored people carried the burden of 
proving their humanity by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.30 
Booker T. Washington epitomized what colored meant. As a 
28 See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION AMERICA's UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 
1863-77 Chap. 3 (1988) [hereinafter Foner, Reconstruction]. 
29 See Harding, The River supra note 26, at 260, 297 and Chap. 14. 
30 This burden can be seen most clearly in the Black Codes which rigidly pro-
scribed and prescribed certain behaviors for colored people. A failure to follow this 
regime could result in criminal sanctions. See Foner, Reconstruction supra note 28, 
199-201, 208-9. The Codes, therefore, exemplify Justice Harlan's notion of the social 
disutility of erroneous outcomes. The standard of proof adopted in establishing the 
existence of particular facts will affect the frequency of erroneous factual findings and 
conclusions. Thus, the choice of the standard of proof reflects an assessment of the 
comparative social disutility of the outcome. In the criminal context, there is more 
disutility in convicting an innocent person than there is in letting a guilty person go 
free. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370-72 (1970). In the post-Civil War South, plac-
ing a high burden of proof on former slaves was a clear indication of how dubious was 
the propositions that colored people were as human as whites and could be useful 
members of society. They had to be controlled in every aspect of their lives. The 
harmful consequences of mistakenly thinking otherwise posed unacceptably high 
risks for whites and society. 
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leader, his power lay in his ability to understand his own times and 
express the aspirations and dreams of those whom he led. His un-
derstanding of "colored" led him to endorse social policies and a 
code of individual behavior that was rooted in his and his follow-
ers' vision of how colored people could survive in America and 
meet their burden of proof.31 For Washington, the best way to 
meet this burden was with deeds. His vision of economic self suffi-
ciency32 was a social and political agenda which directly responded 
to the conception of race held by white people. Economic self suffi-
ciency proved the worth of colored people by transforming them 
through the creative activity of work. Through the acquisition of 
skills and material goods colored people would challenge whites' 
definition of them. 
Washington's Atlanta Exposition speech, in September of 
1895, is perhaps the most concise statement of the meaning of be-
ing colored in America.33 He did not equate being colored with an 
acceptance of racial exclusion and oppression of colored people in 
the South. Instead, he addressed the burden of proof borne by 
colored people. For Washington, full citizenship was the ultimate 
goal of colored people but the road to it had many hurdles. Com-
petency was proven by developing manual skills and a trade, rather 
than by holding a political office. By dutifully following a code of 
individual behavior rooted in hard work and capital accumulation, 
colored people believed they could demonstrate their ability to 
meet and exceed standards endorsed by whites. The focus of this 
approach was not on the fairness of the burden. Colored people 
were as certain of the injustice of the burden they bore as whites 
were of its validity. Instead, colored people turned their attention 
to developing what they viewed was necessary to satisfy their bur-
den of proof: individual initiative, character and responsibility. An 
injustice committed against them because of their race became the 
backdrop against which individual fortitude and worth would be 
demonstrated. Moreover, social integration with whites was secon-
dary to proving that one was worthy and competent: "[i] n all things 
that are purely social we can be as separate as the fingers, yet as the 
hand in all things essential to mutual progress."34 
31 See MANNING MARABLE, BLACK LEADERSHIP FOUR GREAT LEADERS AND THE STRUG-
GLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS xi-xvii (1998) [hereinafter Marabel, Black Leadership]. 
32 See generally VICTOR ANDERSON, BEYOND ONTOLOGICAL BLACKNESS 66-70 (1995); 
FRANKLIN, LIBERATING VISIONS supra note 26, at Chap. 1; MARABLE, BLACK LEADERSHIP 
supra note 31, at Chap. 3. 
33 BOOKER T. WASHINGTON, Up FROM SLAVERY: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 143-46 (1999). 
34 Id. at 145. 
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Washington combined his understanding of colored with a 
prescription for social policy towards colored people. His now fa-
mous "cast down your bucket" metaphor was more than a colorful 
rhetorical device; it was a clever way of introducing a racial-prefer-
ence policy. "To those of the white race who look to the incoming 
of those of foreign birth and strange tongue and habits for the 
prosperity of the South, were I permitted I would repeat what I say 
to my own race, 'Cast down your bucket where you are.' "35 His plea 
was, however, an appeal to rational self interest rather than racial 
justice: 
Cast down your bucket among those people who have, without 
strikes and labor wars, tilled your fields, cleared your forests 
build [sic] your railroads and cities .... Casting down your buck-
ets among my people, helping and encouraging them as you are 
doing on these grounds ... you will find that they will buy your 
surplus land to make blossom the waste places in your fields . 
. . . While doing this, you can be sure in the future, as in the past, 
that you and your families will be surrounded by the most pa-
tient, faithful, law-abiding, and unresentful [sic] people that the 
world has seen.36 
Buckets were not cast down to cure current or past acts of ra-
cial discrimination;37 rather, the act served the economic interests 
of whites. Colored people could be loyal employees or strike break-
ers: a guarantee that would not be given by immigrants. His pos-
ture on these issues also explained the avid support he received 
from white capitalists.38 Washington's understanding of what it 
meant to be colored and the social policies he advocated, 
dovetailed into each other. Colored people sought to prove their 
worth through the following: adhering to a rigid code of personal 
discipline; living a life of exemplary rectitude; developing indus-
trial skills; and capital accumulation. Whites would then have ob-
jective evidence of colored people's skill, loyalty and humanity. 
Affirmative action in this context amounted to nothing more than 
an opportunity to demonstrate competence and value to white 
people by adopting the values of the middle class and protecting 
white-industrial interest from the raising tide of labor unrest in the 
North and South. 
35 [d. at 144. 
36 [d. 
37 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company, 488 U.S. 469, 498-507 (1989) (race 
may be used in governmental decision making when it remedies current or past acts 
of discrimination against the race favored by the decision). 
38 Marabel, Black Leadership supra note 31, at 32-33. 
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Washington recognized that if colored people were to be the 
beneficiaries of the largesse of whites, there had to be a shared 
definition of what colored meant which would then justify, perhaps 
compel, whites to address the social conditions of coloreds. The 
starting point for this definition was specifying characteristics of 
the group which defined the group and delineated the problems 
to be addressed. These characteristics may be cultural, behavioral 
and/ or, as in the case of coloreds, racial in origin. Regardless of 
the characteristics' origin, resources are mobilized and allocated 
pursuant to a conscious and rational social or governmental policy 
to address the problem. The policy is held together by its pre-
sumed rationality and the worthiness of the subjects of the policy.39 
Moreover, a group, in this instance colored people, does not have 
to be powerful to be the subject of beneficial social programs. In 
other words, it does not have to coerce whites to act, but it must be 
willing to endorse to some degree the prevailing definition of the 
group's attributes which justify the social policy. For colored peo-
ple the key attribute was an absence of abilities believed to be nec-
essary for moral and economic development. The acceptance of 
the need to develop these abilities led to policies that focused on 
assisting this powerless group.40 Hence, the power of the "cast 
39 Public policy is often viewed from the perspective of who wins and loses from 
the particular allocation of resources. What is frequently overlooked is the extent to 
which policy is shaped by the social construction of the population targeted by the 
policy. This construction represents the cultural characterizations or popular images 
of the persons or groups whose behavior or well-being is targeted by the policy. In its 
simplest form the targeted population is believed to have shared characteristics that 
distinguish it from other groups and these characteristics are believed to signify cer-
tain values or images. In essence these are stereotypes created by culture, politics 
and/or socialization. Moreover, both the nature of the construction and the policy 
implemented in response conveys messages to the targeted population. It informs 
them of their status and the types of behavior that is expected from the group. See 
Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram, Social Construction Of Target Populations: Implica-
tions For Politics And Society, 87 AMERICAN POUTICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 334, 335-41 
(1993). See also LAURA DUDLEY JENKINS, IDENTrIY AND IDENTIFICATION: AFFIRMATIVE Ac-
TION IN INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES Ch. 1 (1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Wisconsin, Madison) (on file with the William Mitchell College of Law 
Library). 
40 Schneider & Ingram, supra note 39, at 337-39. This is not meant to suggest that 
colored people "accepted" these definitions as being totally accurate. Some may very 
well have. However, the point here is to note the extent to which a policy was built 
upon a particular definition of what colored meant and the burden of proof which 
colored people carried. The issue here is not fairness, rather it is the extent to which 
these policies were rooted in particular views about colored people and the extent to 
which the policy encouraged and rewarded certain types of behavior. The reward was 
clearly intended to shape the view that colored people had of themselves. Id. at 340-
41. The level of the influence is subject to debate, but that the policy did in fact have 
an effect is beyond debate. Cf King, supra note 25, at 4-9 (the mass action civil rights 
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down your buckets" metaphor. Colored people accepted their 
need to develop the desired traits (thus acknowledging at some 
level that they were absent) and whites would offer a helping hand 
in providing the opportunity and material resources to assist 
coloreds in acquiring these traits. 
This process also demonstrates the difference between top-
down and bottom-up social change and how the two can be used in 
constructing social policy. Notice how Washington placed the bur-
den upon colored people to transform themselves inwardly, as in-
dividuals, then outwardly to small groups within the colored 
community. Social change began with a code of personal moral 
and economic conduct. What followed was the social policy that 
recognized, supported and capitalized upon the personal meta-
morphosis. It all started though, with the individual and his willing-
ness to bear up under the burden of accepting Washington's code 
of behavior. This is bottom-up social change. 
While it is beyond the scope of this essay to engage in an in-
depth comparison of the views of Washington and his contempo-
rary W. E. B. DuBois, a brief word is in order because the two men 
presented opposing views of colored people. Dubois is commonly 
viewed as the more radical and prescient of the two leaders; he 
anticipated and laid the ideological groundwork for what we have 
come to know as the civil rights movement. Washington's racial 
conception is viewed as an aberration from Dubois' now widely en-
dorsed positions on race and the struggle for racial equality. Unfor-
tunately, this position is based upon 20/20 hindsight and, more 
importantly, overestimates Dubois' political power and misinter-
prets his relationship with colored people. 
Washington wielded a great deal more political power than 
Dubois, and this difference can be traced to Washington's ability to 
control the patronage of industrial philanthropists. It was Washing-
ton who attended high profile meetings with national political 
leaders, not Dubois. His message of hard work was geared to the 
needs of the masses of colored people struggling to survive in the 
South.41 His concern was the immediate material needs of colored 
people and what colored meant to both colored and white people. 
He has been described as an intercessor between his group and 
whites: one who demanded less for colored people than whites had 
movement created a new sense of self and personal responsibility which was contrary 
to the preexisting view of blacks as being powerless). 
41 Marabel, supra note 31, at 23-33. 
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already conceded.42 One may argue over the effectiveness of this 
approach, but it undeniably represented an accurate understand-
ing of what colored meant. Intercession accepts the power differ-
ential between colored and white people and limited colored 
people to petitioning for the opportunity to demonstrate compe-
tence. An intercessor passionately urges one to "cast down his 
buckets" and does not demand anything as a matter of right. The 
one who responds to the entreaty does so based upon the sincerity 
and moral force embodied by the plea, not its stridency. In effect, 
Washington was the personification of bottom-up change. 
Dubois, on the other hand, was an intellectual. His view of 
what colored people needed extended well beyond the acquisition 
of political rights and material well-being. Colored people needed 
to search for their identity in their own cultural heritage. The arts 
and literature were tools to be used by colored people to free 
themselves from an identity created for them by white people.43 
Dubois assailed the meaning of colored as a cultural phenomenon 
and advocated for the redefinition of race based upon the exper-
iences and culture of colored people. A5 an intellectual, his task 
was to develop and articulate the consciousness of so called 
colored people. Given this task he stood at the periphery of society 
and the masses of colored people.44 
Washington's power lay in his ability to articulate and reflect 
current racial definitions and respond with a social agenda that 
matched those definitions. It is his vision of colored that mirrored 
the contemporary cultural meaning of race. Dubois' vision of race 
42 Id. at 35. 
43 Id. at 43-47. In this regard Dubois is atypical of black civil rights leaders who 
tend to view the race issue in economic and political terms. See Cruse, supra note 12, 
at 92 ("From the black point of view, the Negro intelligentsia does not comprehend 
the strategic importance of the cultural front in relation to the political and economic 
fronts .... They do not see that a truly pragmatic economic and political program 
cannot be put into motion in the United States unless it is simultaneously linked to 
the cultural front."). 
44 Dubois was not, therefore, what Antonio Gramsci would view as a traditional 
intellectual. Traditional intellectuals "are directly involved in the production and re-
production of ideological forms that reinforce domination by the classes that control 
political and economic power. Part of their responsibility is to socialize successive gen-
erations to accept the dominant ideology and power relations with the existing social 
order." Marabel, supra note 31, at 98. DuBois was an organic intellectual. "In contrast, 
organic intellectuals emerge from the most oppressed and exploited social classes and 
groups within society. They generally articulated the consciousness of their classes in 
politics, in social relations and within the economy. Because their connections with 
the elites who control the economy or dominated governmental institutions are tenu-
ous or even nonexistent, their objective class position is implicitly or explicitly in di-
rect conflict with the dominant powers." Id. at 99. 
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was that of a forward looking intellectual seeking to reshape the 
debate over the meaning of race and racial equality, based upon 
the social and cultural history of colored people. Perhaps the best 
way to understand the two men is not to focus on their differences, 
for in the final analysis they both aspired to achieve the same thing: 
the full participation of colored people in American social and po-
litical life. It was their immediate interests that were different. 
Washington committed himself to developing an immediate sur-
vival strategy while Dubois sought to create a new language for 
colored people to use in defining for themselves what colored 
should mean for themselves and whites. 
BLACK 
At some point during the mid-Twentieth century, colored peo-
ple began to disappear and black people began to emerge. The 
difference between the two groups is best understood by examin-
ing the significance of the civil rights movement. The imagery of 
the movement is indelibly etched in our consciousness: the "I Have 
A Dream" speech, marches, bombings and civil rights legislation. 
The permanence of the images suggests to us that their resonance 
was uniformly and universally experienced by the nation. We for-
get, however, that our interpretation of the movement is influ-
enced by our definition of race and the movement is, therefore, 
subject to various interpretations over time. Just as colored could 
not be understood apart from the post-Civil War experience of 
freed slaves, black cannot be comprehended apart from the social 
landscape that existed during the mid 50's to late 60's. The quest 
for racial equality and the meaning of race intertwined with other 
culturally based beliefs, one of which is the ideology of social pro-
gress. The transformation of America from a legally segregated so-
ciety to an integrated one mirrors the presumed general 
movement of civilization in general, and America in particular, 
from belief in myth to enlightenment, ignorance to knowledge and 
superstition to reason. Race mirrors this transformation by having 
its meaning move from an archaic irrational (folk) definition, to-
wards a rationally based one geared to the needs of an egalitarian 
society. This is progress engendered by conscious rational control 
of behavior. It has a momentum of its own which cannot be im-
peded by the idiosyncratic will of individuals.45 
45 See Michael Jordan, From The Constitutionality Of Juvenile Curfew Ordinances To A 
Children's Agenda For The 1990's: Is It ReaU), A Simple Matter Of Supporting Fami~v Values 
And Recognizing Fundamental Rights?, 5 St. Thomas L. Rev. 389, 429 n.148 (1993) ("The 
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The dominant image of the Civil Rights Movement is that it 
responded to a higher calling. In the realm of the sacred, it repre-
sented individual transformations based upon the ideas of brother-
hood and the Judeo-Christian heritage of love and human 
dignity.46 The secular side of the movement represented another 
step in the inexorable evolutionary progression towards a society 
constrained by rationality and individual merit rather than irra-
tional racial classification. What in fact occurred was not an elimi-
nation of irrational racial classification, rather the content of the 
classification changed. Initially, the essence of the Civil Rights 
Movement was a batde to rebut the idea that colored people were 
not fully human. This was accomplished through deeds which sig-
nified one's economic competence and moral rectitude. Black was 
rooted in precisely the opposite notion. There was a presumption 
of humanity and innate human equality. Black was a demand not 
an entreaty. It demanded that whites face their own moral failings 
and give way to the force of social progress and our Judeo/Chris-
tian heritage. Social reform in this instance gathered its strength 
from confidence in the power of the individual, morality and the 
inevitability of progress. 
As with Washington's colored people, the early phase of the 
civil rights struggle was an example of bottom-up change: it re-
duced social change to an individual struggle. Adherence to a per-
sonal code of moral behavior was necessary to illuminate the dark 
side of America's moral duplicity, and as with Washington's ap-
proach, visible public action was necessary to signify the inner 
transformation that was occurring. The direct action movement il-
lustrates this most clearly. The existence of organizations such as 
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People has led to the 
meaning of race has been grafted onto other central cultural images of progress, so 
that the transition from segregation to integration and from race consciousness to 
race neutrality mirrors movements from myth to enlightenment, from ignorance to 
knowledge, from superstition to reason, from primitive to the civilized, from religion 
to secularism, and most importantly, the historical self-understanding of liberal soci-
ety as representing the movement from status to individual liberty."). 
46 See VINE DELORlA]R., GOD Is RED A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION 48 (1994) ("The 
Civil Rights movement was probably the last full-scale effort to realize the avowed 
goals of the Christian religion. For more than a century, the American political system 
proclaimed the brotherhood of man as seen politically in the concepts of equality of 
opportunity and justice equally administered under the law. Equality under the law, 
however, was a secularized and generalized interpretation of the Christian brother-
hood of man, the universal appeal of individuals standing equally before God now 
seen as people standing equally before the law and secular institutions."). See generally 
Cook, supra note 26, at Chap. 4. 
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mistaken belief that there existed a centralized command structure 
that dictated local strategy. In fact, the movement was indigenous 
and decentralized. Colored people were transformed into black 
people because of the institutions, customs and beliefs that existed 
in their communities and interpreted social reality. For blacks this 
meant the church and a history of interpreting the struggle for 
freedom as requiring individual action and responsibility.47 Moreo-
ver, the response of whites was equally decentralized. Individual 
whites were confronted with the behavior of colored people that 
was inconsistent with how colored people were supposed to be-
have. There was no entreaty "to cast down buckets." Instead, there 
were the individual and group confrontatioris challenging the pre-
vailing view of race. Blacks were not attempting to rebut the pre-
sumption of inhumanity which Washington focused on; they were 
telling whites that by creating and believing in the presumption 
whites were offering prima facie evidence of their own immorality. 
Equal opportunity became the phrase that characterized this 
shift from colored to black. It captured the degree to which 
America had betrayed its core values of individualism and self de-
termination. One's success or failure should reflect one's ability to 
compete for limited opportunities under conditions of fair compe-
tition. In this regard, the movement was built upon the corner-
stone of modern liberalism. Its focus was not upon equality of 
results in the competition for limited resources; instead it focused 
upon the fairness of the process by which the results are derived.48 
Black people wanted nothing more than individuality. Tht'y 
wanted to be freed from a racial classification that ignored individ-
ual worth and uniqueness in favor of an all encompassing and op-
pressive definition of race. The movement, therefore, operated at 
two levels. For the individual it was a struggle for racial equality and 
a challenge to any notion that race imposed a burden on individu-
als to prove their moral worth. On a larger scale it was a step for-
ward in the evolutionary process by which America evolved towards 
a more enligh tened and rational society. Both levels began and en-
ded with the individual and his determination to transform 
America through his life and actions. 
This view changed dramatically. It became apparent that 
equality in competition would not remedy the unequal conditions 
47 See King, supra note 25, at 94-99; Morris, supra note 25, at 5-7. 
48 See Cook, supra note 26, at 6-8; JAMES S. FISHKlN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITI', 
AND THE FAMILY 1-2 (1983) [hereinafter Fishkin, Equal Opportunity]; Vincene Ver-
dun, If The Shoe Fits, Wear It: An Analysis Of Reparations To African Americans, 67 Tul. L. 
Rev. 597, 619-22 (1993). 
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that necessarily influenced the results of the competition. With the 
development of an individual identity came the burden of being 
held personally responsible if one did not succeed in competition 
with others. It was this difficulty that the civil rights movement and 
whites began to face. If one were committed to fair competition 
among equals it became increasingly difficult to ignore the effect 
that years of oppression had upon the ability of blacks to com-
pete.49 The result of this type of competition was predictable and 
presumably the prediction could be made based upon skin color. 
Affirmative action was born out of this realization. The focus was 
no longer on individuals and procedural fairness in competition. 
Outcomes became the touchstone by which we measured whether 
racial discrimination continued to exist.50 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
Much has been written about the legal, philosophical and so-
cial justifications of affirmative action. My focus is on where this 
essay began, the folk classification nature of race; the popular be-
liefs about and explanations of differences between people based 
upon race. With the advent of the civil rights movement and the 
disappearance of colored people it was tempting to believe that 
racial classifications had or were in the process of disappearing. 
This sanguine perspective is consistent with our belief that America 
is moving towards a more rational society that has eliminated social 
classifications rooted in ignorance. Unfortunately, the civil rights 
movement did not eliminate folk-based views of race; it simply ad-
ded new images to the popular conception of it. 
Recall the colored man at the punch bowl scenario. What is 
shocking, perhaps embarrassing is a better word, about the state-
ment is its use of a term that seems inappropriate in the post civil 
rights movement era. "Colored" is associated with a time when 
colored people were presumed to be morally and socially incompe-
tent, they had to prove their humanity and value to white Ameri-
cans. Thus, by referring to a "colored" man in the room the person 
was invoking racial imagery that presumably did not survive the 
49 See Desiree Kennedy, Radicalism, Racism And Affirmative Action: In Defense Of A 
Historical Approach, 27 Cap. V. L. Rev. 61,62-64 (1998 ); ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-
BLIND CONSTITUTION 184-191 (1992); Rush, supra note 21 at 21-24; Verdun, supra note 
48 at 629-39; Leland Ware, Turning Back The Clock: The Assault On Affirmative Action, 54 
Wash. V.]. Vrb. & Contemp. L. 3, 5(1998). 
50 See Nathan Glazer, WE ARE ALL MULTICULTURALISTS Now 11-13(1997) (explain-
ing the difference between multiculturalism and affirmative action with its current 
emphasis on quotas and timetables rather than adding diversity in society). 
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Civil Rights Movement. The important point to remember is the 
discomfort caused by the use of an anachronistic term to describe 
race rather than the use of a racial term. A "colored" man at a 
punch bowl signifies both location in a room as well as the compe-
tency and character of the person. We do not refer to Tiger Woods 
as "colored" because "colored" carries the presumption that 
colored people do not possess the skill and intelligence necessary 
to playa white man's game. Jackie Robinson was a "colored" base-
ball player because he was in the process of challenging the pre-
sumption that was firmly entrenched and had yet to be rejected. 
This does not mean, however, that racial folk classifications 
have ceased to exist; their content has simply expanded to include 
new images, ones that may be no more rational than those already 
included in our prior conception of race. We have not evolved to 
the point where race ceases to be a major tool in defining social 
reality in the popular mind. The existence of affirmative action 
programs is evidence that racial folk classifications are alive and 
well in America. Affirmative action is nothing more than a social 
program based upon a particular conception of race. It represents 
as much a social policy rooted in particular beliefs about race as 
Washington's call to "cast down buckets." The difference is that 
Washington's policy was accepted because it was consistent with the 
prevailing conception of race; by contrast, affirmative action is 
neither accepted nor consistent with our conception of race. It is a 
top-down policy solution to a problem that historically has been 
viewed as a bottom-up issue. 
As explained earlier, social policies implemented for discrete 
groups of people are driven by specific conceptions of a group's 
characteristics and the problems created by those attributes. With 
colored people, the question was what policy was appropriate for a 
group of people who were presumed to be morally and socially 
inferior. For Booker T. Washington, the solution was for colored 
people to request a limited opportunity to overcome the presump-
tion of inferiority through deeds and adherence to a rigid code of 
moral and capitalistic behavior. The policy matched the prevailing 
sentiment (folk classification) about the meaning and significance 
of race. However, affirmative action, is a policy that is not in step 
with the prevailing conception of race. The current view was 
shaped by the civil rights movement with its focus on the individu-
ality of black people; the elimination of the burden of proof borne 
by colored people; and the obligation of whites to follow a political 
and spiritual higher calling. At the outset of the civil rights move-
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ment colored people demanded justice based upon the argument 
that the moral and legal trajectory of America was towards a pre-
sumption of competence and the moral worth of all people, re-
gardless of race. 
Affirmative action reintroduces race but from a different di-
rection. Compensatory action is now taken due to incompetence 
that is rooted not in genetic racial differences but socially imposed 
burdens. Being black became the factor which explains one's social 
circumstances and outlook in the same way that being colored had 
been indicative of one's incompetence and subhuman status: skin 
color continued to denote social status and explain one's social cir-
cumstances. What changed during the post-civil-rights era was the 
belief that we can rationally distinguish between the two definitions 
and uses of race. Colored was indicative of one's inhumanity only 
because of the ill-founded and unscientific views of whites. Now, 
however, we know that any negative aspects to being colored can 
be traced to the socio/cultural disadvantages resulting from dis-
crimination. Unfortunately, what many fail to notice is that race is 
still being used in both instances to understand and explain the 
actions of individuals. For colored and black people there devel-
oped a consensus on race as a trait that identifies a group subject 
to corrective governmental policies. The group members have at-
tributes which are in need of remedial action and the group is also 
deemed to be deserving of the necessary intervention. 
It is easy to articulate rational distinctions between the differ-
ent uses and meanings behind the terms "black" and "colored." 
Unfortunately, folk classifications are neither rationally based nor 
subject to logical control and modification. We may reason our way 
to a position where we comprehend the difference between disabil-
ities imposed on a group because of race and disabilities caused by 
race, but it is too fine a line to be drawn in the realm of folk classifi-
cation. The controversy over affirmative action is evidence that 
race-based thinking is alive and well and not as easily manipulated 
or eliminated as policy makers would have us believe. The empha-
sis is on which folk classification of race shall be used, not whether 
the use of any racial classification is appropriate. Thus, there is lit-
tle reflection over the larger question of the extent to which any 
commonly used racial classification represents a social construction 
of reality, rather than an accurate, value-free objective depiction of 
reality. Black is as much a socially created concept which matches 
particular social policies as colored matched others. The former 
requires affirmative action the later the casting down of buckets. 
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There are additional dangers present. Colored people did not 
necessarily disappear with the appearance of black people. What 
occurred was that additional popular conceptions of race were ad-
ded to our store of racial images and definitions used to explain 
the behavior and circumstances of groups. Colored people could 
surge once again to the forefront of the popular conception of 
race if they offered a better explanation of social conditions or pol-
icies implemented in response to current social issues.51 Both black 
and colored are concepts, not concrete things. They ebb and flow 
according to their ability to offer explanations for difficult issues 
that are not necessarily subject to rational control and explanation. 
Finally, affirmative action is also a top-down policy, which rests 
upon our assumptions about the evolutionary process by which 
America is moving towards enlightenment and rational control of 
society and ourselves. Once the need for a policy such as affirma-
tive action was logically assessed, it was imposed upon others based 
upon a loose consensus among policy makers and social activists. 
This was done because of their deeply held faith in their ability to 
control and predict the outcome and effects of remedial policies.52 
Presumably, everyone would eventually comprehend the necessity 
and wisdom of the policy and those who did not were racists or 
unenlightened. In effect, those at the top were waiting for every-
one else to become more rational and abandon primitive notions 
about race in favor of an enlightened and modern perspective 
about the needs and justified demands of black people. 
This is not meant to suggest that anyone opposed to affirma-
tive action is a primitive racist, or that a supporter of it is a progres-
sive thinker. The point is that beneath the legal and social 
arguments garnered for or against the program are folk concep-
tions of race that are never fully acknowledged. It is difficult for us 
to think of a social program aimed at a particular racial group with-
out also invoking the full panoply of popular conceptions of that 
group that have ever existed. Our current popular conception of 
race (black people) was drastically altered by the civil rights move-
ment and subsequent events such as the black power movement 
with its emphasis on black nationalism and its justification of the 
use of violence.53 As a result, affirmative action simply does not fit 
our current popular conception of race. It is no longer deemed 
51 See Smedley, supra, note 14, at 27; Gordon, supra note 22, at 116-18, and supra 
note 22 accompanying text. 
52 See generally THOMAS SOWELL, PREFERENTIAL POLICIES AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPEC-
TIVE ch. 5 (1990). 
53 See generally STOKELY CARMICHAEL AND CHARLES HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE 
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fair to presume nonwhites are incompetent. White America is be-
lieved to have faced its betrayal of our liberal Judea-Christian heri-
tage by denying the humanity of colored people. America is 
believed to be moving through its evolutionary progression towards 
a more open and rational society. Colored people have disap-
peared. In their place, we have black people who do not need af-
firmative action because this program is inconsistent with a society 
that views itself as having achieved rationality and equal opportu-
nity. Finally, blacks are more assertive, even strident, and America 
is not going to give anything to a strident race. Things are given 
("buckets cast down") to those who are deemed humble and ac-
cepting of their inherently diminished status. If affirmative action 
does not fit our image of blackness, we may find ourselves resorting 
to former conceptions of race that offer a more satisfying interpre-
tation of remedial programs such as affirmative action. 
CONCLUSION 
I recognize that my views are easy prey for the charge that I 
want blacks to return to the good old days when we were less de-
manding, passive and appreciative of what little favors whites would 
do for us in the name of charity. When I was a kid during the early 
60's being colored was being an Uncle Tom. I am not an Uncle 
Tom. The issue is not whether I, or anyone else, has a particular 
view of race. We all do whether or not we are willing to admit it. 
What is important is that we should not deceive ourselves into 
thinking that anyone of us has a rational and objective view of race 
that exists outside of the social context in which we live. That is, we 
can simultaneously use race and transcend it so that we achieve a 
social condition where race represents an eternally accurate repre-
sentation of reality. The last time this belief was held, it was called 
scientific, and later, discredited. Yet, we still believe that we now 
have a clearer understanding of race, since older scientific claims 
about race have been exposed, once and for all, to have been 
fraudulent. However, this view will invariably lead us to repeating 
previous errors. That is, after exposing the fallacy behind previous 
false and invidious conceptions and uses of race, we now have the 
true meaning of race at our disposal for use in constructing our 
social reality. In effect, we know now what race really means to us. 
We are now as certain about what black means as we previously 
were certain about what colored meant. With this certainty we are 
POLITICS OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA (1967); THEODORE DRAPER, THE REDISCOVERY OF 
BLACK NATIONALISM ch.8 (1970); King, supra note 25, at Chap. 6. 
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ready to make the social world over in this new flawless racial im-
age. This certainty, perhaps hubris is a better word, needs far more 
scrutiny than what has been applied to it. 
We pose the greatest threat to ourselves when we believe that 
it is possible for a society to evolve to a point where it is capable of 
possessing a high degree of insight into social problems and with 
that insight construct solutions based upon value-free criteria. We 
know what is correct because of our belief that an objective view of 
history demonstrates certain values and views of race to be more 
enduring and beneficial. Social problems and the race issue are 
then reduced to technological rather than ideological issues. M-
firmative action owes its origin, in part, to this view. Mter decades 
of racial conflict and debate, we believe we have a more insightful 
and less dangerous view of what race does and does not mean. It is 
now possible to think logically about it and derive policies free 
from older, less objective belief systems. The controversy over af-
firmative action demonstrates that, even assuming we can reach 
that point in America, we are not there now. 
Affirmative action rests on two fallacies. First, it is believed that 
since America is moving along the path of progress and away from 
invidious biologically based views of race, it is now possible to have 
benign race-based programs. This would be a program based upon 
an accurate rational conception of what race really means. The 
problem is that there never has been a time when contemporary 
social thinkers and policy makers did not believe that they also had 
the real meaning of race, only to later discover that they were 
wrong or racist. That is why Booker T. Washington went from be-
ing a powerful leader to an Uncle Tom- from a paladin and leader 
of colored people, to a betrayer of black people. Race is, and always 
will be, a social construct, devoid of any inherent meaning and fil-
led only with the significance that our culture and history ascribe 
to it. A value free racial category is an oxymoron. 
The second fallacy is a corollary to the first. A social program 
based upon race can survive based simply upon our rational belief 
that it is a good thing even though the program is inconsistent with 
the very assumptions undergirding the program. No matter how 
much affirmative action may have been viewed as the right thing to 
do, it simply ran afoul of what "black," as opposed to "colored," 
means in America. Perhaps Justice Thomas is correct in being 
skeptical about race-based social policy. However, a better way of 
understanding his skepticism is to recognize that racial categories, 
when used for any purpose, call forth every popular conception of 
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race we have ever used in our culture. We have not evolved to the 
point of eliminating a particular view of race; we simply emphasize 
some aspects over others. Affirmative action calls forth former con-
ceptions of colored people on the one hand, and on the other, the 
presumption of incompetence which they worked so arduously to 
rebut. This stock racial image was not eliminated, it was simply 
overshadowed by black people, their heroic struggle for individual-
ity, and their demand for respect. 
No matter how much affirmative action may make rational 
sense, it opens the door for the reintroduction of colored people, 
not through a conscious choice, but simply because these are the 
limited and crude tools at our disposal when we think about race. 
That is, the popular mind may believe that we need affirmative ac-
tion because colored people really could not rebut the presump-
tion that was placed on them. Conversely, black people may resent 
accepting popular definitions of race in a vein similar to that of 
how colored people accepted buckets that were cast down based 
upon dehumanizing assumptions held by whites. They may disa-
gree with the popular assumptions justifying the policy but accept 
it to the extent necessary to keep the policy going and receive some 
measure of benefit from it. We are not moving towards tran-
scending racial categories when we use affirmative action, we sim-
ply become more firmly mired in them. As long as we see a colored 
man, black man, or man of color standing by the punch bowl, we 
will carry race as a societal millstone which we will bear but cannot 
fully control or comprehend. 
